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Abstract : From 2014–15, China witnessed a 
super bull in its stock market, as the major SSE 
Composite Index was more than doubled, but it 
was followed by an unprecedented crash 
triggering a global sell-off. This article argues 
that margin trading, which means investors that 
borrow money from stock brokers or shadow 
banks to purchase shares, accounted for the stock 
bubble. 
 
 
Introduction  
Since China started its market-oriented economic reform 
in the late 1970s, entrepreneurs across the country have 
established millions of privately owned businesses, whilst 
dominant state-owned firms have been shut down or 
transformed into modern corporations.1 It is clear that the 
growing financing demand from both private and public 
sectors can only be satisfied with the establishment of a 
modern securities market.2 Therefore, in the early 1990s, 
the authority decided to open the stock market to allow 
Chinese businesses to raise funds from the public; a vital 
step in the country’s ongoing financial reform. In 1990 
and 1991, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were opened 
respectively with the objective to facilitate the transactions 
of stocks, bonds, funds and derivatives, and to support the 
growth of real economy.3 Being China’s economic 
heartland, Shanghai naturally became the first city in 
mainland China to hold a stock exchange. Shenzhen, the 
 
 
 
country’s entrepreneurship hub in which many world-
class technology companies like Huawei, Tencent and 
Dajiang Innovation are located, won the opportunity to 
operate the second stock exchange in China. In 1992, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
was set up by the State Council as the watchdog for 
securities and future markets. There are three main 
functions for the CSRC: to maintain a transparent, fair 
and equitable market; to strengthen the protection of 
investors, in particular retail investors; and to facilitate 
the sound development of capital markets.4  
After more than two decades of rapid development, 
China now has the most dynamic capital market in the 
world. Thousands of successful businesses floated their 
shares on the SSE and SZSE (831 public companies listed 
in Shanghai and 1,700 in Shenzhen) whilst millions of 
retail investors joined the equity market to take a bet on 
the rising economy. Recently, Shanghai and Shenzhen 
were ranked as the fourth and seventh largest stock 
exchanges in the world in terms of their total market 
capitalisation (see the table below). Moreover, according 
to the World Bank, the Chinese stock market is the second 
largest one in the world, just next to the US.5 
 
Table 1: Market Capitalisation of the World’s Top 
Stock Exchanges (March 2016)6 
R a n k - Stock Exchanges Market   Capitalisation 
ing  (US $billion) 
1 US (NYSE Euronext) 18,171.31 
2 US (Nasdaq OMX) 7,048.55 
3 Japan (Japan Exchange Group) 4,602.10 
4 China (Shanghai) 3,930.17 
5 UK (London Stock Exchange 3,805.18 
 Group)  
6 Europe (NYSE Euronext) 3,353.62 
7 China (Shenzhen) 3,094.78 
8 China (Hong Kong) 3,023.54 
9 Canada (Toronto) 1,767.31 
10 Germany (Deutsche Börse) 1,655.37 
   
 
Despite its enormous size, China’s stock market is still 
in its nascent stage of development as inexperienced retail 
investors dominate the trading and regulatory loopholes 
can be widely seen. The most recent example of market 
failure is the stock market crash in the middle of 2015, 
when the majority of Chinese investors suffered great 
losses in a period of several weeks. It also lead to market 
  
* Lerong Lu is PhD Candidate at School of Law, University of Leeds, UK; Attorney-at-Law, PRC; contact available at: lw12ll@leeds.ac.uk. Longjie Lu is PhD 
Candidate at School of Law, University of Leeds, UK.  
1 For the convenience of international readers, the Chinese currency (yuan or CNY) in this article is accompanied by a conversion into US Dollars. The exchange 
rate between Chinese yuan and US dollar is 6.69:1, on 10 July 2016. 
2 After the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Communist Party implemented the centrally planned economic model (similar to that of the Soviet 
Union) for nearly three decades. During that time, all economic and financial activities were organised under the State’s plans rather than by the market discipline. The 
securities exchanges in China, therefore, were shut down in 1952. See Robin Huang, Securities and Capital Markets Law in China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014), pp.4–5. 3 Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) available at: http://www.sse.com.cn/aboutus/sseintroduction/introduction/; Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), 
http://www.szse.cn/main /aboutus/bsjs/bsjj/index.shtml [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
4 China Securities Regulatory Commission available at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/about/ [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
5 World Bank, “Market capitalization of listed domestic companies” available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 6 World 
Federation of Exchanges and the Bloomberg. See Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, Market Capitalisation of the World’s Top Stock Exchanges (December 2016) 
available at: http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/files/SOM/MarketStatistics/a01.pdf [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
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turbulence in other major markets in Asia, Europe and 
the US.7 Although market observers around the world 
have already realised the increasing importance of the 
Chinese market, most of them still have limited 
knowledge about how it works and what kind of 
regulation it is subject to. 
Therefore, this article attempts to provide some 
discussion and analysis regarding China’s recent stock 
market bubble as well as relevant regulatory issues. It will 
proceed as follows. The second section looks into the 
details of the 2014–15 equity bubble, whilst the third 
section continues to examine the sudden burst of the 
speculative bubble in June 2015. Next, the fourth section 
tries to reveal the driving force behind the boom-and-bust 
of China’s stock bubble. The stock market speculation was 
largely inflated by the rising margin financing activities in 
China as numerous investors borrowed money to purchase 
shares. Therefore, it was referred to as the “leveraged bull” 
by some media, driven up by CNY 4 trillion (US $598 
billion) margin loans.8 After that, the fifth and sixth 
sections introduce two popular forms of  
 
 
margin finance in China respectively: the margin 
lending service provided by official securities brokers, 
and the Peizi (money-matching) business which refers 
to margin loans offered by grey-market money houses 
or online peer-to-peer lending platforms. Finally, the 
seventh section assesses how the Chinese regulator 
reacted to the stock market crash, with a particular 
focus on the regulation of margin finance. 
 
China’s stock market mania  
In recent years, an extremely high level of volatility has 
been seen in China’s stock market, with the benchmark 
indices swinging up and down as much as 10% in a 
single trading day.9 In July 2014, China entered a 
strong bull market as the major SSE Composite Index 
rose by two-and-a-half times in less than one year. It 
climbed from around 2,000 points in July 2014 to the 
peak of 5,166.35 points on 12 June 2015, marking an 
equity bubble and attracting many investors to 
participate in the speculation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index (January–July 2015)10 
 
A similar bullish trend was also observed in the SZSE, 
in particular its ChiNext board—China’s equivalent to the 
NASDAQ of the US. ChiNext is a second board market in 
Shenzhen where most listed companies are high-tech firms 
or those in emerging industries of strategic importance. As 
of February 2016, there were 495 companies listed in the 
ChiNext with a total market 
 
 
capitalisation of CNY 4,282.38 billion (US $660 billion).11 
One year later in June 2015, the ChiNext Index nearly tripled 
from around 1,300 points to 3,899.71 points.12 Clearly, the 
overheated speculation of Chinese technology stocks is 
similar to the US dotcom bubble in the late 1990s. The share 
price of recently listed companies on the ChiNext board 
posted an average gain of 500%, 
 
7 Andrew Walker, “China share turmoil: How it affects the rest of the world”, BBC News, 7 January 2016 available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
34040679 [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
8 See, for example, “Reflection on the leveraged bull”, Caixin Weekly, 6 July 2015 available at: http://weekly.caixin.com/2015-07-03/100824828.html [Accessed 1 
November 2016]. 
9 The stock exchanges in China has imposed a daily price change limit of 10% on the trading of listed companies’ shares, so normally share price as well as relevant 
indices can only rise or fall up to 10% in a day. 
10 Google Finance available at: http://www.google.com.hk/finance/historical?q=SHA:000001&gl=cn [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
11 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, “About ChiNext” available at: http://www.szse.cn/main/en/chinext/ [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
12 ChiNext Price Index, Bloomberg available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SZ399006:IND [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
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making it the most valuable market in the world in 2015.13 
For example, Beijing Baofeng Technology Company, an 
Internet video platform listed in ChiNext, launched its IPO 
on 24 March 2015 with its shares 291 times 
oversubscribed by investors.14 On its debut date, the share 
price of Baofeng jumped by 44%, the maximum ceiling 
allowed by the Chinese regulator.15 Since its floating, the 
stock price kept rising by the 10% ceiling every day for 
two months. The price increased by 40 fold from CNY 
7.14 (US $1.07) to more than CNY 300 (US $44.84) at the 
end of May, before its trading was suspended. At the peak, 
the market value of Baofeng was CNY 36.9 billion (US 
$5.69 billion) and its price-to-earnings ratio (P/E ratio) 
reached a surprisingly high level of 881.79 times.16 
Evidently, the share price of the Baofeng far exceeded its 
real value.  
It is clear that the dramatic rise in share prices of most 
public companies indicated a speculative bubble in China. 
In June 2015, the P/E ratio of the entire ChiNext board 
reached 130, which was considered as more than twice a 
reasonable level for companies with strong business 
prospects.17 Moreover, the stock market fever also spread 
from mainland China to Hong Kong. The arrival of 
billions of dollars from Chinese retail investors in 2015 
pushed the Hong Kong stock market to a record high, as 
the trading volume in Hong Kong alone was more than 
double of that of the combination of London, Frankfurt 
and Paris.18 Due to the fast expansion of Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock markets, China now has the world’s 
second largest securities market in the world. According to 
the World Federation of Exchanges, the global equity 
trading volume in 2015 surged by 55%, mainly driven by 
the strong performance in China.19  
In addition to the soaring stock price and trading 
volume, there was other evidence showing the formation 
of an equity bubble. For instance, the best sign of a 
financial bubble might be the rapid increase in the number 
of share trading accounts. From June 2014 to May 2015, 
more than 40 million share dealing accounts were opened 
by Chinese retail investors.20 Currently, the number of 
 
 
 
individual investors in China amounted to 90 million, 
surpassing the number of members of China’s ruling 
Communist Party which stood at 87.8 million in 
2014.21 Therefore, we can say it is the new investors 
carrying a huge amount of money that pushed the stock 
market to a seven-year high. Having seen a lot of 
relatives, friends and colleagues who became rich 
overnight by purchasing shares, more and more 
investors were attracted to the market by the bull 
euphoria. The reason why the Chinese population is 
enthusiastic about buying shares is that the interest rate 
of savings has been kept very low by the central bank, 
which is even unable to beat the inflation rate.22  
In contrast to capital markets in countries like the US or 
the UK, where institutional investors play a dominant role 
in trading, retail investors in China contributed to more 
than 90% of daily turnovers.23 However, according to a 
widely cited survey, 67% of new investors in China did 
not even complete the high school education—they are 
generally ordinary working class, farmers, housewives and 
retired people.24 Clearly, it demonstrates the wide 
participation of unsophisticated investors in the recent 
stock rally.25 The truth is that many Chinese households 
have switched their money from savings, properties and 
wealth management products to the stock market in order 
to make quick money in the bull run. However, most of 
them do not have sufficient financial knowledge and skills 
to carry out the investment, nor professional financial 
advisors to provide investment advice.  
During this stock market boom, a large number of 
young people, born in the 1980s and 1990s who had 
begun to work in recent years and had accumulated some 
savings, began to invest. Unlike their parents or 
grandparents who prefer to buy shares of blue chip 
companies, the younger generation tend to use a more 
radical investment strategy and favour smaller businesses 
with a strong growing prospect, such as companies listed 
on the ChiNext board. According to a survey of Xinhua, 
China’s State media, 31% of undergraduate students in 
China have taken part in the stock market investment in 
 
 
 
13 Saikat Chatterjee and Elzio Barreto, “China’s IPO market undaunted by ghosts of dotcom boom and bust”, Reuters, 20 May 2015 available at: 
http://www.reuters.com /article/us-china-chinext-idUSKBN0O52O420150520 [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
14 “China’s IPO froth bubbles over”, Financial Times, 30 April 2015 available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d788db72-ef53-11e4-87dc-00144feab7de.html [Accessed 
1 November 2016]. 
15 “China’s IPO froth bubbles over”, Financial Times, 30 April 2015.  
16 “Baofeng Technology rose 10 times in a quarter: how long will the legend last?” Sina Finance, 3 July 2015 available at: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20150703 /130522584262.shtml [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
17 “China’s stock market: A crazy casino”, The Economist, 26 May 2015 available at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2015/05/chinas-stockmarket [Accessed  
1 November 2016]. 
18 Gabriel Wildau and Josh Noble, “China investors: Stock market fever”, Financial Times, 10 April 2015 available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6a83b534-df30-11e4-852b -
00144feab7de.html [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
19 World Federation of Exchanges, “2015 Market Highlights” available at: http://www.world-exchanges.org/home/index.php/files/18/Studiespercent20-
percent20Reports /293/2015percent20Marketpercent20Highlights.pdf [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
20 “There Are Now More Stock Traders in China Than Communist Party Members”, Bloomberg, 30 June 2015 available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015 -06-30/in-
communist-china-stock-market-capitalists-now-rule [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
21 “There Are Now More Stock Traders in China Than Communist Party Members”, Bloomberg, 30 June 2015.  
22 For instance, in China the interest rate for current deposit is 0.30–0.35%, and the rate for one-year fix-term deposit is 1.5–2%. See “Deposit Rates of Major Banks 
in China”, Hexun available at: http://data.bank.hexun.com/ll/ckll.aspx [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
23 “China’s stock market: A crazy casino”, The Economist, 26 May 2015.  
24 Orville Schell, “Why China’s stock market bubble was always bound to burst”, The Guardian, 16 July 2015 available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/16 /why-
chinas-stock-market-bubble-was-always-bound-burst [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
25 It remains uncertain that whether the figure of the above survey is accurate or not, and in response to this, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange clarified that 46.9% of its investors hold at 
least a college degree. See “Half of China’s stock market investors have college degrees”, Xinhua, 7 April 2015 available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015 -
04/07/c_127662898.htm [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
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2015.26 A quarter of student investors put more than 
CNY 50,000 (US $7,474) into the equity market and 
the money primarily came from their parents as living 
fees.27 Dreaming of getting rich fast, college students 
are in fact amateurs who lack proper financial 
knowledge, investment skills and risk awareness. Many 
of them simply believed that “even though there exist 
risks and bubbles in China’s share market, the state is 
able to maintain its health to prevent the collapse”.28  
In the eyes of many investors, the 2014–15 bull market 
was implicitly endorsed by the Chinese Government, as 
the Xi-Li administration is determined to deepen the 
economic and social reform in China, which can be good 
news for the long-term stock market investment.29 Besides, 
the State media even played a cheerleader role in the stock 
rally. For instance, People’s Daily in April 2015 released a 
commentary article saying that 4,000 points (of the SSE 
Composite Index) was just the beginning of a bull 
market.30 The news of this kind seemed to pass a message 
that the Government was in fact supporting the rally, 
which encouraged more investors to join the speculation 
regardless of the overvalued share price.  
Further evidence indicating an equity bubble might be 
the prevalence of “concept stocks”. In the Chinese stock 
market, the word “concept” refers to some investment 
storylines which are linked to recent hot economic, 
financial or political news, and the share price of a certain 
company associated with such concepts can rise 
drastically in a short time. These kinds of bullish concepts 
and themes range from the state-owned enterprise 
reform—President Xi’s “New Silk Road” Eurasian 
infrastructure plan—to titanium dioxide, 3D print and 
Industry 4.0.31 Instead of analysing the fundamentals of 
listed companies, a large number of Chinese investors 
simply pick up their stocks according to popular stock 
concepts. For instance, one overheated investment concept 
in 2015 was the reform of state-owned enterprises in 
China which dominate the country’s key industries such as 
banking, telecom, energy and railway. Thus, when the 
rumour of merging China’s two largest train 
manufacturers, the CSR Corp and the CNR Corp, started 
to circulate, the share price of them rose by more than 200% 
in a couple of weeks.32 Investors believed that the 
 
 
concept stocks can bring them extra profits so they 
rushed to buy the same stock at the same time, which 
often pushed prices higher in a short space of time. 
However, when investors lost interest in it and pulled 
out money, the share price fell quickly in the same way. 
 
The burst of the bubble  
After the SSE Composite Index reached its peak of 
5,166.35 on 12 June 2015, it began to slump at an 
unprecedented speed. The Index fell by nearly 30% within 
three weeks. By 3 July 2015, the market capitalisation in 
the SSE and SZSE had lost value worth CNY 18.6 trillion 
(US $3.78 trillion). As it suddenly ran into a bear market, 
in early July, more than 1,000 public companies in China 
decided to suspend the trading of their shares in order to 
prevent their share prices from falling further.33 Such a 
large scale of trading suspension had never been seen 
before in the history of the Chinese market. Clearly, the 
temporary measure to suspend trading was able to calm 
down nervous investors while the entire market was 
waiting for a government bailout.  
The Chinese stock market was on a roller coaster in the 
following months. In the period from June–August 2015, 
40% of the market value was wiped off. In particular, on 
24 August 2015, which was dubbed as “Black Monday” 
by the State media Xinhua, the SSE Composite Index fell 
by 8.49% in a trading day, the largest fall so far.34 
Moreover, Black Monday triggered a global fear about 
China’s diming economic prospect, as the country might 
face a potential hard landing, which could lead to a new 
round of recessions around the world. Therefore, the 
woeful performance of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets had an immediate impact on major financial 
markets in Asia, America and Europe. The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average in the US dropped 1,000 points when it 
opened on Black Monday.35 The share prices of blue chip 
American companies such as the General Electric and 
Pepsi fell by more than 20% at one point during that day. 
On the following Tuesday, the Chinese market continued 
to slump as the SSE Composite Index fell by 7.6%, which 
again caused sharp falls in most global markets.36 Some 
commentators, therefore, 
 
 
 
26 “Stock Investment Became A Trend in Universities”, Xinhua, 3 June 2015 available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2015-06/03/c_1115496945.htm [Accessed  
1 November 2016]. 
27 “Stock Investment Became A Trend in Universities”, Xinhua, 3 June 2015.  
28 “Stock Investment Became A Trend in Universities”, Xinhua, 3 June 2015.  
29 The Xi-Li administration, through a series of new economic and social reforms, aims to achieve social equity, provide the economic dividend of China’s growth for most people, as 
well as reform the sluggish state-owned enterprises. See Tom Mitchell, “Xi’s four-point plan gives reason for optimism”, Financial Times, 15 November 2013 available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4469ec2c-4e06-11e3-8fa5-00144feabdc0.html [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
30 Tom Mitchell, Gabriel Wildau and Josh Noble, “A bull market with Chinese characteristics”, Financial Times, 10 July 2015 available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0 /082499ca-2658-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca.html [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
31 For a full list of recent stock concepts in China, see 10jqka Finance available at: http://q.10jqka.com.cn/stock/gn/ [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
32 Wildau and Noble, “China investors: Stock market fever”, Financial Times, 10 April 2015.  
33 “A rare scene in the 24-year history of A-stock market: thousands of companies suspended trading to avoid risks”, Global Times, 8 July 2015 available at: http://finance  
.huanqiu.com/gsjj/2015-07/6941603.html [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
34 The term “Black Monday” was first used to describe what happened to the US’s stock market on 19 October 1987, when the Dow Jones Index fell by more than 22% 
in a day. See Scott Cendrowski, “China’s ‘Black Monday’ as stock market slides 8.5 per cent”, Fortune, 24 August 2015 available at: 
http://fortune.com/2015/08/24/chinas -black-monday-as-stock-market-slides-8-5/ [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
35 Matt Egan, “After historic 1,000-point plunge, Dow dives 588 points at close”, CNN, 25 August 2015 available at: http://money.cnn.com/2015/08/24/investing/stocks 
-markets-selloff-china-crash-dow/ [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
36 “Chinese stocks tumble for a second day after global fall”, BBC News, 25 August 2015 available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34048084 [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
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compared China’s stock market crash in 2015 to the 
Wall Street crash in 1929 and the global financial crisis 
in 2007–08, as all of them resulted in great economic 
turmoil.37  
Nonetheless, it is Chinese investors, particularly the 
emerging middle class who suffered most from the stock 
market crash. During the first three weeks of the stock 
market turbulence, the average loss per trading account in 
China amounted to CNY 420,000 (US $62,782), making 
the total loss equal to the market capitalisation of 
Shenzhen-listed companies at the peak of the bull 
market.38 As said previously, a large number of retail 
investors entered into the market when the SSE Composite 
Index was already at the 4,000 points or higher, so they 
soon lost one-third to half of their money when the market 
started to crash. Despite the rapid fall, many investors still 
had strong confidence in the market since they expected 
the Government would intervene, rescue the market and 
make it rebound. For instance, according to the Financial 
Times, a young investor from  
 
 
 
Suzhou whose loss equalled the value of a luxurious 
car, still believed that 6,000 or even 8,000 points is not 
a fantasy and that the market will finally bounce back.39 
However, the Chinese market has been falling steadily 
since June 2015, and the SSE Composite Index reached 
a 13-month low of 2,638.30 points on 27 January 
2016.40 Clearly, the share prices of most Chinese public 
companies were more than halved during the crash. 
 
What accounts for China’s recent 
stock rally?  
Generally speaking, the share price of public companies 
will go up during economic booms and go down during 
economic recessions. Nevertheless, this round of bull 
market in China from 2014–15 saw the contrary side of 
the rule. The rapid rise in share price was neither 
supported by the development of real economy nor the 
improvement in the fundamental of Chinese businesses. In 
fact, the year of 2015 witnessed the slowest growth of 
Chinese economy in the recent decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: China’s Annual GDP Growth41 
 
According to the chart above in fig.2, China’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.9% in 2015 compared 
with one year earlier. Although the growing rate is 
perceived as a decent figure, it is much slower than the 
double-digit growth rate in the previous three decades. 
Clearly, China’s economy is facing multiple challenges at 
the moment. For example, manufacturing activities, which 
have been a vital pillar in the country’s economy, have 
been in a difficult situation due to the weakening global 
and domestic demands after the global financial 
 
 
crisis. The Caixin purchasing managers index (PMI), an 
indicator for observing the manufacturing industry, always 
fell below the threshold of 50 points in 2015, suggesting 
 
37 See, for example, Larry Elliott, “China’s Black Monday is worryingly similar to Wall Street’s 1929 crash”, The Guardian, 25 August 2015 available at: http://www  
.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/25/parallels-new-york-1929-shanghai-2015-wall-street-crash-china-stock-market-crisis [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
38 Tencent Finance available at: http://finance.qq.com/a/20150704/009361.htm [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
39 Mitchell, Wildau and Noble, “A bull market with Chinese characteristics”, Financial Times, 10 July 2015.  
40 Laura He, Enoch Yiu and Xie Yu, “China stocks end wild session slightly lower as state funds return to prop up market”, South China Morning Post, 27 January 2016 available at: 
http://www.scmp.com/business/markets/article/1905794/china-stocks-end-wild-session-slightly-lower-state-funds-return [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
41 National Bureau of Statistics of China, “National Data—GDP” available at: http://data.stats.gov.cn/ks.htm?cn=C01&zb=A050 [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
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a continuous contraction of the industry.42 Therefore, 
since 2011, an increasing number of Chinese 
businesses have become insolvent as a result of 
declining sales and profits—so they started to default 
on bank loans or private loans from shadow lenders, 
leading to a massive credit crisis in China with many 
bosses running away to evade debts.43 Apparently, the 
weak macroeconomic environment in China seemed 
impossible to support the bull market from 2014–15.  
Therefore, market observers have been searching for 
what accounts for the irrational exuberance in the Chinese 
securities market, and the answer may be debts. During 
the stock rally, millions of Chinese investors borrowed 
money to purchase shares, whether from their securities 
brokers or from grey-market shadow banks. The practice 
of buying shares by borrowing money is called margin 
trading, which amplifies the potential gains as well as 
losses. Even though margin trading is a common practice 
in most developed markets, it had been totally banned in 
China until recently. In 2010, the CSRC relaxed relevant 
rules regarding margin trading and short selling in order to 
promote investments in a bear market lasting for many 
years.  
In the recent stock rally, the amount of outstanding 
margin loans rose from CNY 698 billion (US $104 
billion) in October 2014 to a peak of CNY 2.7 trillion 
(US $404 billion) on 18 June 2015.44 It clearly 
explained where the money came from. If investors 
meet certain requirements, they will be able to borrow 
up to twice of their own capitals from securities brokers. 
In addition, investors can choose to borrow money at 
very high leverage from some semi-legal Peizi 
companies (money-matching firms). It has less rigid 
requirements but charges higher interest rates. 
Moreover, margin financing businesses often employ 
complex financial structures such as the umbrella trust, 
which will be discussed later. In summary, through 
margin financing, a large amount of credits has been 
injected into China’s stock market, which pushed up 
the share price. Such a bull market fuelled by debts is 
therefore called the “leveraged bull”. 
 
Table 2: Two major forms of margin finance in China  
 Official  Margin Fi- Underground Margin Fi- 
 nance  nance 
Who   is the  125 official securities Money-matching firms or 
lender? firms  authorised and peer-to-peer online lending 
 supervised   by the platforms. 
 CSRC.45   
    
 
 
 
   Official Margin Fi- Underground Margin Fi- 
   nance      nance 
Annual interest Around 8.5%, depend- 18–24%.47 
rate   ing on the amount of  
   investors’  self-own 
   capitals.46      
Capital thresh- Investors  shall have No capital threshold for 
old for investors cash or securities worth investors. 
   more  than CNY 
   500,000 under their 
   share dealing accounts.  
Other require- Investors  shall have No other requirements for 
ments for in- been using the account investors. 
vestors   to trade securities for 
   more than 6 months; 
   passing a series of 
   credit and risk checks.  
Limitation on Investors can only bor- No limitation. 
shares that can row money to  buy 
be purchased shares of certain compa-  
   nies which are on a list  
   approved by the CSRC  
   (most blue chip compa-  
   nies).        
M a x i m u m 1:2       1:5 
leverage ratio         
           
 
Margin financing service provided 
by official stock brokers  
Official Margin trading is a kind of securities credit 
transaction that allows investors to borrow loans from 
their securities brokers to buy shares, funds or other 
securities. Investors have to provide cash or securities 
under their share trading accounts as collateral in order to 
borrow funds, and once the loans are issued, investors will 
be obliged to pay back the principals and interests on the 
maturity date. If investors are optimistic about the stock 
market and believe the share price of a certain company 
will increase in the future but lack funding, they can build 
up a leveraged long position through borrowing money 
from securities firms.48 On the contrary, investors who 
believe that the share price of some public companies will 
drop but want to profit from the falling market, can 
borrow a certain amount of shares from their brokers and 
sell them immediately. They will wait to buy the same 
amount of shares back in the future at a lower price and 
return them to brokers. This kind of financial trading 
activity is called short selling. 
 
 
 
 
42 “Caixin’s China PMI contracts 10th-straight month”, Financial Times, 4 January 2016 available at: http://www.ft.com/fastft/2016/01/04/caixins-china-pmi-contracts-10th -straight-
month/ [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
43 Lerong Lu, “Runaway Bosses in China: Private Lending, Credit Crunches, and the Regulatory Response” (2015) 18(9) Financial Regulation International 1.  
44 Mitchell, Wildau and Noble, “A bull market with Chinese characteristics”, Financial Times, 10 July 2015.  
45 For a full list of securities companies in China, see Securities Association of China, “2015 Securities Firms Operating Performance Ranking” available at: http://www.sac  
.net.cn/ljxh/xhgzdt/201606/P020160606393113547678.pdf [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
46 Wind Info, (22 March 2016) available at: http://114.80.154.46/ns/findsnap.php?ad=0&sitetype=1&sourcetype=1&id=363090856&t=1 [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
47 “The Investigation of A-share Leverage Investment”, Sina Finance, 24 March 2016 available at: http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-03-24/doc-
ifxqsxic3073401.shtml [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
48 Zhaojing Chen, G. Nathan Dong and Ming Gu, “The Causal Effects of Margin Trading and Short Selling on Earnings Management: A Natural Experiment from China”, First 
Annual Volatility Institute at NYU Shanghai (VINS) Conference (2015), SSRN available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795640 [Accessed 22 February 2017]. 
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Table 3: Revenues of top securities companies in 
China49 
S e c u r i t i e s Total Revenue Income from Margin Percent- 
Companies in 2015 (A) (in Finance  and  Short a  g  e 
  CNY million) Selling Service (B) (B/A) 
CITIC Securi- 34,093.00 7,227.18 21.20% 
ties     
Guotai Junan 29,828.84 7,407.05 24.83% 
Securities    
Guosen Securi- 27,360.79 5,894.06 21.54% 
ties     
GF Securities 27,242.65 7,497.86 27.52% 
Haitong Securi- 25,692.08 6,645.92 25.87% 
ties     
     
 
China started to introduce margin finance and short-
selling services for its retail investors in 2010. They 
have become a major source of income for China’s 
securities firms, in addition to traditional services like 
stock brokerage, investment banking and asset 
management. From Table 3 above, we can see that 
amongst the largest Chinese securities firms (in terms 
of revenue), the income from making margin loans and 
short selling contributed to over 20% of their revenues 
in 2015. For instance, the GF Securities experienced a 
rapid growth in its margin finance and short-selling 
services as the total outstanding loan balance hit CNY 
66.9 billion (US $10 billion) by the end of 2015.50 The 
interest income from making margin loans amounted to 
CNY 7.49 billion (US $1.12 billion), an increase of 
191.76% from one year earlier.  
Margin finance not only benefits securities brokers by 
bringing more revenues but also provides Chinese 
investors with a brand new investment strategy. It enables 
investors to use borrowed money to wager on the rising of 
share price. Clearly, as a leverage investment tool, it can 
inject more funding into the securities market and largely 
increase the trading volume, which supports the bullish 
trend. When the share price continues to rise, investors can 
multiply their gains through the use of margin loans. In 
June 2015, when the Chinese market was on top, the 
amount of total outstanding margin loans was around 
CNY 2 trillion (US $299 billion), showing the popularity 
of investment with margin finance.51 However, margin 
finance is a double-edged sword since, under certain 
circumstances, it may cause huge economic losses for 
people using it. For instance, if too many inexperienced 
investors have the access to margin finance, like what 
happened in China’s recent stock rally, the share price and 
relevant indices will be pushed upward to an unreasonable 
high level with the input of excessive funding from the 
whole financial system. This is how a stock bubble was 
created this time. Moreover, when the market starts to fall, 
investors will suffer multiple losses depending on the 
leverage ratio, but usually the risk of 
 
 
 
losing money is often ignored or underestimated by 
investors when they first borrow money. In some cases, 
the broker will ask investors to deposit more cash as 
security if the price of their equities falls to a certain 
level, making the total value of their shares less than 
the amount of margin loan. If investors cannot add 
enough money into the account on time, the broker will 
sell securities and liquidate the account to repay the 
margin loans immediately. (It is called “margin call”.)  
Taking a margin loan to buy shares is similar to taking a 
mortgage loan to buy a property. Investors borrow money 
from security brokers with the loan being secured against 
investors’ cash, shares, fund units or other securities. The 
purpose of employing margin financing is to magnify 
potential gains, particularly during the bull run when share 
prices of most public companies rise quickly. For instance, 
Investor A and Investor B both have CNY 100 in their 
trading accounts. A uses the money to buy 100 shares of X 
Company (CNY 1 per share * 100 shares). If the share 
price rises by 20% to CNY 1.2, A will have a profit of 
CNY 20 (CNY 100 * 20%). Meanwhile, Investor B also 
buys CNY 100 worth shares of X Company, and then use 
his shares of X company as security to borrow another 
CNY 100 from the broker. B uses the borrowed money to 
buy another 100 shares of X Company and he has shares 
of X company worth CNY 200. If the share price still 
increases by 20%, Investor B will gain a profit of CNY 40 
(CNY 200 * 20%, deducting any fees and interests paid to 
the stock broker). Therefore, the investment return rate of 
B is 40% compared to the 20% return earned by A who 
does not borrow money. It shows how margin trading can 
increase your returns if the market is a good condition. 
However, if the share price falls, investors borrowing 
margin loans will suffer multiple loss. In the same 
scenario, if the share price falls 50%, Investor A will 
suffer 50% of loss, or CNY 50. In contrast, Investor B will 
lose CNY 100 (CNY 200 * 50%), which means that B 
nearly loses all of their capital as they have to deposit 
more cash into the account or are subject to the margin 
call to liquidate their account to pay off the CNY 100 debt 
owed to the stock broker. 
 
 
The development of margin finance 
in China and the bull market  
Despite being a common investment tool in securities 
markets in developed countries, margin trading is 
relatively new in China. On 8 January 2010, the State 
Council of China decided to introduce both margin trading 
and short-selling practices to the market.52 In February 
2010, the CSRC launched a long-awaited pilot scheme, 
allowing shares of 90 blue chip companies on the 
  
49 The data is compiled based on Securities Association of China, “2015 Securities Firms Operating Performance Ranking”.  
50 GF Securities, 2015 Annual Report (2016), p.39 available at: http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2016-03-19/1202058936.PDF [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
51 “In June 1.13 Trillion Yuan Flooded Into The Stock Market”, Securities Times, 2 July 2015 available at: http://www.stcn.com/2015/0702/12331556.shtml [Accessed 
1 November 2016].  
52 Paget Dare Bryan, “Index Futures Trading, Margin Trading and Securities Lending in China Finally Launched” (2010) 11 Journal of Investment Compliance 23, 23. 
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approved list to be sold short or purchased on margin.53 In 
December 2011, the CSRC decided to increase the number 
of constituent securities to 280, including 7 exchanged-
traded funds (ETFs) as the original pilot programme 
turned out to be successful. With the attempt to enhance 
market efficiency by the introduction of margin trading 
and short selling, the Chinese regulator  
 
 
regarded it as a significant step in the ongoing capital 
market reform.54 As discussed, in the recent bull market 
from 2014–15, margin finance was widely employed 
by China’s retail investors and the chart below 
compiled by the authors demonstrates how margin 
financing affects the stock prices and indices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Margin trading and stock bubble55 
 
The chart shows the fluctuation of both margin 
financing outstanding loan balance and the SSE 
Composite Index during the same period of time when the 
bullish trend was developing in 2015. Clearly, the 
ascending or descending trends of both figures are roughly 
in the same direction. It means that when investors 
borrowed more and more margin loans from January–June 
2015, the amount of outstanding loans kept rising, driving 
up the share price with the influx of trillions of yuan. By 
late June, there was a sharp fall in the margin financing 
figure as investors pulled out their money from the stock 
market, leading to the diving of the SSE Composite Index. 
This article, therefore, argues that there is a positive 
correlation between the movement of share prices and 
 
 
margin financing activities. When there is increasing 
margin lending activities, the share price of public 
companies goes up and vice versa. It is safe to say that 
the most important driving force behind this round of 
bull market was margin trading.  
According to the scenarios discussed above, the 
employment of margin trading tools can exponentially 
increase investors’ gains from the rise of share price. In a 
bullish market, the leverage effect of margin trading will 
encourage more people to borrow money to buy shares, 
which leads to a significant growth in both stock price and 
trading volume. Accordingly, the share market looks 
healthy and dynamic at first. However, as more and more 
people who want to make quick money are drawn 
 
 
53 Eric C. Chang, “Short-selling, margin-trading, and price efficiency: Evidence from the Chinese market” (2014) 48 Journal of Banking & Finance 411, 411; Saqib Sharif et al, 
“Against the Tide: The Commencement of Short Selling and Margin Trading in Mainland China” (2014) 54 Accounting and Finance 1319, 1323. 
54 See CSRC, “CSRC Will Recently Launch the Pilot Programme of Margin Trading and Short Selling” (5 October 2008) available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite /zjhxwfb/xwdd/200810/t20081005_68632.html [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
55 The chart is made by authors by using the data of margin trading balance and the SSE Composite Index. For margin trading balance available at: 
http://www.sse.com.cn /market/othersdata/margin/sum/ [Accessed 1 November 2016]. For the SSE Composite Index, see fig.3 above. 
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to the equity speculation, with a large amount of borrowed 
money, the share price will be pushed up to a sky-scraping 
level, creating an asset bubble. The relationship between 
the rising margin loan balance and the uprising stock price 
is similar to an upward spiral. When the share price 
continues to rise, it seems a win-win situation for 
everyone, as not only investors can earn good returns but 
also brokerages profiting a lot from undertaking margin 
loans and charging dealing fees. Therefore, broker firms 
often encourage investors to borrow more money to buy 
shares, regardless of the risky nature of margin financing. 
In China’s case, they even breached the threshold rules to 
make margin loans to those who do not have enough 
capital or investment experience to use margin financing 
according to rules stipulated by the CSRC and stock 
exchanges, which will be discussed later.  
What is more, the impact of margin trading on share 
prices is increased to some extent due to the fact that the 
Chinese market is dominated by retail investors (Sanhu) 
who lack investment knowledge and skills and can be 
irrational. As stated, tens of millions of retail investors in 
China contributed to over 90% of trading volumes. It is 
clear that the existence of massive retail investors 
significantly enhances the leverage effect of margin 
trading.56 It is because a large proportion of Chinese 
investors, lacking independent judgement, tend to follow 
the crowd and pursue concept stocks as we said which 
increases the volatility of share price movement. When the 
price of a concept stock begins to take off, a large amount 
of capital coming from margin loans will take the lead and 
push price up further, then thousands of Sanhu trying to 
catch up the rising trend will put their own money in. It 
results in the accelerating rise of share price, forming a 
beautiful bubble before it finally bursts. 
 
Shadow margin lending: money-
matching firms and umbrella trusts 
 
Although the official margin financing is closely watched 
by the CSRC, there are still a large number of so-called 
money-matching firms in China extending margin loans to 
investors. Money-matching firms operating in the 
underground market remain outside of the regulatory 
regime. They are shadow lenders which finance their 
businesses by bank credits or through complicated 
financial structures like umbrella trusts and then offer loan 
service to stock market investors by charging interests and 
fees higher than the official service provided by securities 
brokers. Some money-matching firms even set up online 
lending portals, which is similar to that of peer-to-peer 
lending, in order to allow investors to borrow 
 
 
 
funds online. For example, Miniu, a leading online 
money-matching platform, was launched in April 2014 
and, until this year, its total amount of loans was 
approximately CNY 4.9 billion (US $730 million).57  
The business of money matching for securities 
investment emerged soon after China’s stock markets 
started operating in 1990 but the industry had remained 
relatively small until 2014 when the bull market took off. 
Most borrowers utilising money-matching services used to 
be professional retail investors. Since 2014, at the arrival 
of the bull market, a large number of individual investors, 
who cannot meet the strict requirements to open official 
margin financing accounts, have been trying to approach 
money-matching firms to borrow funds to wager on the 
bull run. By early 2015 as the industry experienced rapid 
growth and became a mature market, market leaders 
including Xunqianwang.com and Miniu98.com held a 
grand China Money Matching Industry Conference in 
Wuzhen in East China, with the theme of “Using 
Innovation to Win the Future”.58 More than 550 people 
from well-known money-matching firms, news media, 
securities brokers and professional investors attended the 
conference to discuss the future path of the industry, 
technical issues like risk control as well as co-operation 
opportunities within the industry. According to the 
organising committee of the Conference, in 2014, China 
had nearly 10,000 money-matching platforms, which 
collectively provided credits worth more than CNY 100 
billion (US $16 billion) for Chinese investors across the 
country.59 At the peak of the stock bubble in 2015, the 
market scale of all underground loans made by money-
matching firms could be as much as CNY 1 trillion (US 
$160 billion).60 Clearly, abundant funding borrowed from 
money-matching firms and official securities brokers 
contributed to China’s super bull market in 2015.  
Unlike official margin trading, few regulatory rules are 
applied to this grey market, so relevant financial risks are 
obvious. First, the threshold for investors using money-
matching platforms is much lower than that of official 
margin loans offered by brokerages. As stated, regulated 
securities brokers only allow investors, having cash or 
shares worth more than CNY 500,000 and passing a strict 
risk test, to use the margin financing service. However, in 
the underground market, no threshold standard exists, 
which means any investor is able to borrow money to buy 
shares regardless of their financial condition and 
investment skills. Secondly, the leverage level of 
underground loans, without regulation, can be much 
higher than that of official margin loans, resulting in 
excessive risks, particularly when the market plummets. 
The leverage ratio can reach 5:1, namely, investors who 
have capitals of CNY 1 million can borrow another CNY 
  
56 Yuwen Deng, “The Regulatory Responsibility of the Stock Bubble”, Caijing Magazine, 29 June 2015 available at: http://comments.caijing.com.cn/20150629/3914490  
.shtml [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
57 Xiaocui Liu, “The CSRC Levied Penalties Against Money Matching Businesses”, Wall Street China, 18 September 2015 available at: http://wallstreetcn.com/node/223747 
[Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
58 “2015 China Money Matching Industry Conference Launched in Wuzhen”, Sina News, 30 April 2015 available at: http://zj.sina.com.cn/news/regional/2015-04-
30 /1217259097.html [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
59 “2015 China Money Matching Industry Conference Launched in Wuzhen”, Sina News, 30 April 2015.  
60 Gabriel Wildau, “Shadow lending crackdown looms over China’s stock market”, Financial Times, 25 June 2015 available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6963a7c6-
1a5a -11e5-a130-2e7db721f996.html [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
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5 million to buy shares.61 Such a high level of leverage can 
bring considerable profits for investors when the market is 
in the rising trend, as an increase of 10% in the share price 
can bring 60% gains if five times the amount of money 
has been borrowed. However, if the market starts to fall, a 
decrease of around 17% in share value can lead to the 
complete loss of the origin capitals of investors. Most 
speculators only see the potential benefits but ignore 
potential risks brought by margin lending. Thirdly, unlike 
official margin lending which limits purchasable shares to 
certain blue chip firms operating at a reasonable P/E ratio, 
money-matching firms have no limits on which shares 
investors can borrow money to  
 
 
buy.62 Consequently, a large number of investors borrow a 
loan to purchase shares of high-tech companies listed on 
the ChiNext board. In a nutshell, the lower threshold 
condition, coupled with high leverage and no limitation on 
shares that could be bought, allows ordinary retail 
investors to borrow money to gamble in the overheated 
market, resulting in the formation of a speculative bubble.  
Moreover, due to the limited amount of capital, many 
money-matching firms or online lending platforms use an 
umbrella trust to raise money and then lend the money out 
to investors seeking extra funding to purchase shares. The 
picture below shows a simplified structure of a popular 
umbrella trust in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The structure of an umbrella trust63 
 
A trust firm establishes several sub-trusts to operate the 
investment business, and within each sub-trust, there is a 
senior tranche and a subordinate tranche. The senior 
tranche provides subscribers with a fixed return, and 
usually banks buy the senior tranche and then divide it 
into small portions which are sold to its high-net-worth 
clients as Wealth Management Products (WMPs). WMPs 
guarantee attractive returns around 8% annually for 
purchasers who are unsatisfied with low interest returns of 
bank deposits, which has become a popular investment 
 
 
choice for Chinese savers in recent years. On the other 
side of the trust, money-matching firms or other 
investment institutions purchase the subordinate tranche 
which has access to using the money in both senior and 
subordinate tranches. In fact, subscribers to the 
subordinate tranche borrow money from the senior tranche 
by offering a fixed sum of money as interest to investors 
of the senior tranche. If any loss occurs, buyers of the 
subordinate tranche have to absorb the loss in the first 
place but they also enjoy all profits from the security 
 
 
61 Wildau, “Shadow lending crackdown looms over China’s stock market”, Financial Times, 25 June 2015.  
62 Wildau, “Shadow lending crackdown looms over China’s stock market”, Financial Times, 25 June 2015.  
63 The chart is made by the authors of this article. 
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speculation after the fixed return is paid to holders of 
the senior tranche. In short, the umbrella trust is 
essentially a financial investment vehicle to allow 
people to borrow funds to undertake investments.  
That is how money-matching firms obtain funding 
by creating an umbrella trust and subscribing to its 
subordinate tranche. In the meantime, these firms also 
hold share trading accounts at some security brokers 
and use specially designed software systems, such as 
Hundson’s Homs, Shanghai Mecrt Corporation 
(Mingchuang) and Hithink Flush Information Network 
(Tonghuashun), to divide their trading accounts into a 
number of sub-accounts for each client to trade shares 
separately.64 If clients want to borrow money, money-
matching portals will deposit the money into individual 
accounts, which are closely monitored by the general 
account. Clearly, money-matching firms exert ultimate 
control over individual sub-accounts, and are able to 
liquidate each account when significant losses occur 
and pose a threat to the safety of capitals provided by 
the firms. The second-level accounts opened by money-
matching firms are actually not allowed by the 
securities regulator as the security law requires 
investors to use real identity to open share trading 
accounts, but these sub-accounts are in fact not 
registered with stock exchanges.  
It is apparent that money-matching firms and their use 
of umbrella trusts increases the market volatility to a great 
extent. Billions of yuan have been channelled from WMPs 
bought by banks’ clients to securities investors through a 
complex trust structure, inflating the market speculation. 
When the market begins to surge, millions of investors 
could easily borrow funding up to several multiples of 
their own capital to join the speculation. However, when 
the market starts to fall, the trust firms have to initiate a 
margin call if the decrease of value in securities bought 
with borrowed money passes a certain point depending on 
the leverage level. They will ask investors to deposit more 
cash or sell off the shares to pay off margin debts. If 
investors are unable to bring in more money to maintain 
the minimum margin, or the market falls too quickly, 
money-matching platforms will liquidate the account 
immediately to prevent platforms from entering into a loss, 
which therefore increases the falling speed in a short time. 
Worse still, the rapid decline in share price will trigger a 
panic effect in the stock market where more investors rush 
to sell the securities they hold, resulting in a downward 
spiral of share prices. In particular, speculators using 
borrowed money suffer from steep losses due to the 
magnifying effect of leverage and they 
 
 
 
do not even have a chance to wait for the market to 
rebound since the lenders force them to sell shares to 
pay off loans. 
 
The regulatory responses to the 
stock crash  
After the crash, the Chinese Government has adopted a 
series of measures to save its stock markets from falling 
further and prevent a potential economic crisis. For 
instance, at the end of June 2015, the People’s Bank of 
China cut the benchmark interest rates as well as the 
reserve requirement of banks to inject more credits at an 
affordable price into the economy.65 At that moment, the 
Government tried to avoid a sudden and steep slowdown 
of economy which could lead to more unemployment and 
a large scale of defaults causing systemic risks to the 
whole financial system. What is more, 21 state-owned 
securities companies have been asked by the CSRC to 
spend around CNY 120 billion (US $17.9 billion) to 
purchase blue chip ETFs in order to stabilise the market 
and keep the SSE Composite Index above 4,500 points.66 
The effort, however, turned out to be a failure as the Index 
continued to fall to the bottom of around 2,600 points in 
January 2016. Also, the CSRC banned large shareholders 
of public companies (holding stakes over 5%), their senior 
executives and board members from selling their shares 
for a period of six months, hoping the halt of massive 
selling could lift the market.67 Other bailout measures 
included a central bank-backed equity purchase plan 
through the China Security Finance Company, which will 
lend securities firms up to CNY 260 billion (US $38.9 
billion).68 Although the use of a central bank’s money to 
buy shares would probably undermine the market 
discipline and the credibility of Chinese securities markets, 
the Government decided to do so as they regarded the 
stability of financial markets and the economy as the top 
priority in the current situation.  
It is clear that the Chinese Government has spared no 
efforts to use multiple tools to stop the market from 
slumping. However, the real effect of the rescue package 
has remained limited, as the SSE Composite Index was 
still falling in the following months, and most companies 
on the ChiNext board lost as much as two-thirds of their 
values. The myth of China’s wealth story was broken and 
millions of middle-class families became losers in this 
game, in particular those who borrowed margin loans to 
buy shares. Furthermore, the strong government 
intervention this time could be a big step back for China’s 
market-oriented reform in past decades, which 
contravened the Government’s promise to let the market 
play a decisive role in the economic operation. 
 
 
64 Chuin-Wei Yap, “China’s Hundsun Freezes Stock Platform Accounts Amid Scrutiny”, The Wall Street Journal, 16 July 2015 available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles /chinas-hundsun-freezes-stock-platform-accounts-amid-scrutiny-1437039845 [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
65 Patti Waldmeir, “China central bank cuts benchmark interest rates”, Financial Times, 27 June 2015 available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6e9af244-1cbc-11e5-
aa5a -398b2169cf79.html [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
66 Dongliang Li, “21 Securities Brokerages Promised to Contribute 120bn to Stabilise A-share Market This Morning”, Securities Times, 6 July 2015 available at: 
http:/ /finance.sina.com.cn/stock/zldx/20150706/071622598238.shtml [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
67 Josh Noble and Gabriel Wildau, “China curbs stock sales in effort to halt market rout”, Financial Times, 8 July 2015 available at: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9382843e -2511-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c.html [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
68 Mitchell, Wildau and Noble, “A bull market with Chinese characteristics”, Financial Times, 10 July 2015. 
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Nonetheless, the biggest lesson China has learned this 
time is to realise the power of market and leverage. 
Next, the article is going to explain how the Chinese 
regulator dealt with official margin financing services 
and grey-market lending before and after the crisis. 
 
The regulation of official margin finance 
 
In order to control and reduce systemic risks, maintain the 
sustainability and health of the capital market as well as 
protect the interests of investors, the Chinese Government 
has enacted a series of rules and regulations, which lay 
down the legal basis for the supervision of margin trading 
activities. In 2006, the CSRC enacted the Pilot Regulation 
of Margin Trading and Short Selling in Securities Firms 
(the 2006 Regulation).69 When the pilot scheme was 
completed, the CSRC revised the 2006 Regulation and 
replaced it with the Pilot Regulation of Margin Trading 
and Short Selling in Securities Firms (the 2011 
Regulation), which came into effect on 26 October 2011.70 
The SSE and SZSE also published their own 
implementation rules of margin trading and short selling 
following the enforcement of the 2011 Regulation.71  
According to the 2011 Regulation, only certain 
securities firms licensed by the CSRC are able to offer the 
service of margin trading to equity investors.72 In order to 
be qualified, securities firms must apply to the CSRC and 
follow the procedural requirements.73 Then the CSRC is 
responsible for examining whether the firms materially 
fulfil the conditions listed in the 2011 Regulation before 
granting a permission. The CSRC will investigate the 
firm’s relevant experiences, financial situation, inside 
governance and risk management, penalty records, client 
documentations, compliant handling mechanism, 
information security system and so on.74 Apart from the 
requirements for securities firms, there are limitations on 
investors who are eligible to open accounts with securities 
firms for margin financing. The 2011 Regulation listed the 
standards by which securities firms must observe in order 
to ensure the suitability of investors.75 Before opening any 
margin financing account, a securities firm shall carry out 
a series of credit investigations of the applicant, and know 
the identity, property, incomes, securities investment 
experiences and risk preferences of the customer. The 
2011 Regulation also prohibits clients 
 
 
in the following situations to open a margin finance 
account if: they fail to provide the relevant information as 
required; they take part in the securities dealings for a 
period of less than half a year; their transaction settlement 
funds are not put aside in the custody account held by a 
third party; their securities investment experiences are 
insufficient; they lack the ability to undertake investment 
risks; those who have records of major breach of contracts 
with the security firm; those who are major shareholders 
(having shares of over 5%); or those who are related 
parties of the securities company that they apply to open 
the margin finance account with.76 If customers are 
eligible for margin trading after the test, a securities firm 
could open the margin finance accounts and take a certain 
proportion of margin and collateral which must satisfy a 
minimum proportion.77 However, the 2011 Regulation did 
not explicitly stipulate the minimum standard. Instead, the 
implementation rules made by the SSE require that the 
margin proportion shall not be lower than 50%.78  
Although the 2011 Regulation and other relevant rules 
seem to be comprehensive and detailed, the result of 
compliance was far from satisfying. In January 2015, on 
the completion of the fourth on-site inspection of margin 
trading and short selling at the offices of some leading 
securities firms, the CRSC announced the decision to 
punish 12 brokerages due to their violation of rules in the 
2011 Regulation, such as offering margin trading to 
ineligible clients and extending overdue margin loans 
illegally.79 In practice, several securities firms lowered the 
capital threshold (CNY 500,000 or US $74,740) for 
investors to open margin trading accounts, exposing risks 
to unsophisticated investors. In some cases, even investors 
with CNY 100,000 (US $14,948) were allowed to borrow 
loans from their brokers.80 The reason for securities firms 
to encourage more investors to borrow margin loans is 
clear for they can earn considerable interests and fees over 
lending money. Also, as more money is being poured into 
the securities market, the trading volume will 
consequently increase so securities companies can earn 
more trading commissions.  
The CSRC issued warnings to some of the brokerages 
and ordered others to correct their wrongful practices as 
well as to enhance inside censorship in order to prevent 
malpractice happening again. In response to this, the 
 
 
 
69 CSRC, The Pilot Regulation of Margin Trading and Short Selling in Securities Firms, No.2006(69) available at: http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/chongqing/xxfw/tzzsyd/200607 
/t20060705_90320.htm [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
70 CSRC, The Pilot Regulation of Margin Trading and Short Selling in Securities Firms (Amendment), No.2011(31) available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic /G00306201/201110/t20111028_201127.htm [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
71 SSE Implementation Rules of Margin Finance and Short Selling, SSE available at: http://www.sse.com.cn/services/tradingservice/margin/rules/c/c_20150912_3987306  
.shtml; SZSE, “SZSE Implementation Rules of Margin Finance and Short Selling” available at: http://www.ewww.com.cn/rzrq/files/007.pdf [Both accessed 1 
November 2016].  
72 2011 Regulation s.3.  
73 2011 Regulation s.6.  
74 2011 Regulation s.5.  
75 2011 Regulation s.11.  
76 2011 Regulation s.12.  
77 2011 Regulation ss.2 and 23.  
78 See SSE Implementation Rules of Margin Finance and Short Selling s.36. Margin Proportion = Margin Value/(Number of Securities * Price of Securities) *100%.  
79 “CSRC: 12 Securities Firms’ Margin Trading and Short Selling Illegal—Two Kinds of Problems”, Sina Finance, 16 January 2015 available at: http://finance.sina.com  
.cn/stock/quanshang/qsyj/20150116/173321317516.shtml [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
80 Jinze Jiang, “CITIC, Haitong and Guotai Jun’an Violated Rules of Margin Finance”, Wall Street China, 16 January 2016 available at: http://wallstreetcn.com/node/213243 
[Accessed 27 February 2017]. 
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Chinese stock market plunged on 19 January 2015 as the 
SSE Composite Index fell by 7.7% to 3,116.35 points at 
the close; the biggest drop of the index since June 2008.81 
The share prices of two of the largest securities firms in 
China, Citic Securities and Haitong Securities, both fell 10% 
on that day as they were suspended from making new 
loans to any investor for three months as a punishment for 
providing margin loans for unqualified investors.82 The 
suspension raised the fear that extra liquidity from margin 
loans was stopped from entering the stock market, which 
could turn the bull market into a bear one. On the other 
hand, the penalties showed the concern of the regulator 
regarding the overheated stock market resulting from the 
rapid rising margin loans. In June 2014, the total amount 
of margin loans was CNY 400 billion (US $59.8 billion) 
but, after only six months, the figure surged to CNY 1.1 
trillion (US $164 billion) in January 2015. During the 
same period, the SSE Composite Index rose by 67%. 
Therefore, the regulator, by imposing penalties to 
securities firms, attempted to curb stock purchases using 
margin loans. However, the real effects remained limited 
as the speculation fever continued and more investors 
tended to shadow banks to borrow margin loans. 
 
After the January 2015 stock market plummet, the bull 
trend stopped for a while but soon regained its momentum. 
In the first half of 2015, the SSE Composite Index rose 
from around 3,000 points to more than 5,000 points. 
Following the big crash in June 2015, the CSRC enacted 
the amendment of the 2011 Regulation. On 1 July 2015, 
the CSRC released Decree No.117 to publish the modified 
Regulation of Margin Trading and Short Selling in 
Securities Firms (the 2015 Regulation).83  
In this amendment, the CSRC has established a 
countercyclical adjustment mechanism,84 aiming to 
strengthen the prudential supervision and risk control of 
margin finance activities. The so-called countercyclical 
adjustment mechanism means that the CRSC, along with 
the SSE and SZSE and securities brokers, can make 
dynamic adjustments to the requirements of margin 
finance for their clients in accordance with the latest 
market situation.85 When the market is overheated and the 
margin loan outstanding balance rises too fast, they can 
take actions to refrain margin investment activities. In 
contrast, if the stock market is underperforming, the 
regulators and securities companies can relax certain 
requirements to encourage qualified investors to use 
 
 
 
margin finance to purchase shares and thus lift the 
market. For instance, stock exchanges can make 
countercyclical adjustments by raising or lowering the 
margin ratio—changing the types of securities which 
can be used as investors’ collateral, the converting rate 
between the price of securities and the amount of 
margin, as well as what securities can be purchased 
with margin loans. Therefore, by relaxing or tightening 
the rules and specifications around margin transactions, 
and by enlarging or narrowing the scope of object 
securities of margin finance, the regulators can realise 
the goal of macro-level prudential regulation and 
maintain market stability in the long term.  
Furthermore, a significant change in the 2015 
Regulation is the stricter requirement on investor 
eligibility, which prohibits brokers to offer margin loans 
to those investors having securities assets worth less than 
CNY 500,000 in the recent 20 trading days.86 Compared to 
the previous rule in the 2011 Implementation Rules of 
SSE, which only stated a general CNY 500,000 threshold 
without a certain period of time, the new rule set a higher 
standard. Also, the condition of a 20-day period makes the 
investor suitability provision easier to implement in 
practice, setting up a uniform standard for all brokerages 
to comply with. In addition, the 2015 Regulation stipulates 
that the total margin trading outstanding figure of any 
securities firms shall not exceed four times of the amount 
of their net assets.87 Clearly, this rule emphasises on the 
prudential operation of securities firms by limiting their 
margin loans total to the condition of capital level.  
Despite the tightened rules on investor eligibility and 
the scale of margin finance, the CSRC also relaxed some 
restrictions in other aspects, attempting to offer more 
flexibility to securities companies. For instance, the 
maximum term of a margin finance contract was six 
months before; but now the restriction has been removed 
and stockbrokers can extend the term after 6 months.88 
Other loosened policies included the removal of the 
mandatory liquidation rule and the requirement of 
investors’ collateral.89 Now the brokerages have discretion 
to decide whether to liquidate investors’ accounts if the 
price of securities bought by margin loans falls to the red 
line, by negotiating with the investors to increase 
collateral. Through these deregulatory actions, the CSRC 
aims to return more powers to the market and let it play a 
more decisive role in allocating capital resources. Besides, 
the CSRC attempts to establish a regulatory 
 
 
81 “Chinese Stocks Plunge Most in Six Years on Lending Curbs”, Bloomberg, 19 January 2015 available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-19/china-
s -stock-index-futures-plunge-on-margin-trading-suspensions [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
82 “Chinese Stocks Plunge Most in Six Years on Lending Curbs”, Bloomberg, 19 January 2015; in accordance with the SSE Implementation Rules of Margin Finance, 
brokerages shouldn’t lend to investors with assets below CNY 500,000. According to the 2011 Regulation s.45, the CSRC has been given the power to take actions on 
any infringement in brokerages’ margin trading and short-selling activities.  
83 CSRC, The Regulation of Margin Trading and Short Selling in Securities Firms, No.2015(117) available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/zjhpublic/G00306201/201507 /t20150701_280175.htm [Accessed 1 November 2016]. 
84 2015 Regulation s.36.  
85 CSRC, “Regulation of Margin Trading and Short Selling Has Been Released” (1 July 2015) available at: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhxwfb/xwdd/201507 /t20150701_280174.html [Accessed 1 November 2016].  
86 2015 Regulation s.12.  
87 2015 Regulation s.20.  
88 2015 Regulation s.14.  
89 In the SSE Implementation Rules, the value of investor’s collateral could be lower than 130% of the loans borrowed for margin financing or short selling. When the 
collateral decrease to less than 130%, the brokerage must inform its client to add more collateral to 150% of the debts. See SSE Implementation Rules of Margin 
Finance and Short Selling ss.40 and 41. 
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framework which is efficient and appropriate for the 
soundness and health of the margin financing market. 
Since the underground margin finance expanded very fast, 
a more efficient market with standardised regulations and 
supervisions may be conducive to encourage more 
qualified investors to choose the official margin finance 
service over shadow lenders and thereby the interests of 
investors can be better protected under a formal regime.  
The preparation work for the 2015 Regulation started 
earlier than the burst of the recent stock bubble. The draft 
of the new regulation was published on 12 June 2015 
when the CSRC started to call for public comments.90 The 
original deadline of the public consultation was 11 July 
2015. However, during this time, the Chinese stock market 
witnessed the big crash and investors suffered heavy 
losses. Therefore, the turmoil in the stock market actually 
accelerated the publishing process of the new Regulation. 
Before the deadline of the public consultation, the CRSC 
hurried to finalise the 2015 Regulation and announced it to 
the public on 1 July 2015. The purpose of making the 
2015 Regulation was for the long-term development of 
margin financing activities, so it was clearly incapable of 
stopping the market slump. Nevertheless, the new 
Regulation can, to some extent, help maintain the public 
confidence in the market and stop the contagion91 since it 
released a signal that the regulator has been actively taking 
actions and drafting new rules to standardise margin 
finance transactions, improve investor protection and 
market stability. 
 
The regulation of money-matching firms 
 
In terms of unofficial margin loans provided by money-
matching firms and online lending platforms, the Chinese 
regulator decided to crack down on these grey-market 
lending activities. As discussed, money matching has been 
widely blamed for the high volatility in China’s stock 
market turbulence as it allows ordinary investors to 
borrow money up to five times the value of their own 
capital, thereby taking excessive risks. On 12 July 2015, 
the CSRC issued an official document to curb grey-market 
money lending activities.92 The CSRC ordered securities 
brokers to clean out sub-accounts opened and managed by 
money-matching firms in order to ensure that only 
registered accounts with real names and national ID 
numbers could be used in securities transactions.93 By 
stopping the co-operation between securities companies 
and money-matching firms, the 
 
 
CSRC is able to stop these firms from offering new sub-
accounts to investors. According to China’s Securities 
Law, the securities registration and clearing house should 
open trading accounts only for investors under their own 
names.94 However, money-matching firms hold an account 
at their securities broker but employ software like HOMS 
to create a large number of sub-accounts affiliated to a 
firms’ own account. The sub-accounts are therefore not 
known to securities brokers nor to the regulator, which 
will be used by retail investors to purchase shares on 
margin without official regulation. Accordingly, the first 
step of the CSRC’s task force to clean illegal shadow 
lending is to terminate accounts for money-matching 
companies’ new clients.  
Following the CSRC’s document issued on 12 July 
2015, money-matching platforms responded quickly to 
the latest regulatory change. For instance, the leading 
platform Miniu98.com removed all of its online 
advertisements about providing margin lending for 
investors to buy shares, as well as shutting down the 
securities investment funding service on its website 
overnight.95 On 13 July 2015, Miniu released an open 
letter to its customers saying that they were going to 
halt the service of margin lending. In fact, at that time, 
the CSRC did not explicitly classify money-matching 
activities as illegal activities despite the banning of sub-
accounts offered to new investors. Miniu’s CEO Mr 
Liu Yang explained that: “We stop the money-
matching activities on a voluntary base mainly for the 
risk-control concern.”96 After Miniu’s announcement, 
other leading lenders like Xunqian.com and 658 
Finance also suspended their money-matching services. 
Apparently, the CSRC’s action was a devastating blow 
to the entire money-matching industry as the ban of 
running sub-accounts, to a large extent, means the end 
of all shadow margin loans.  
In September 2015, after an investigation carried out by 
the CSRC, Miniu was fined CNY 60 million (US $9.26 
million) for illegal operation of securities business under 
the PRC Securities Law.97 Moreover, three information 
technology companies: Hundson, Shanghai Mecrt Corp 
and Hithink Flush Information Network, which designed 
and operated the software for money-matching platforms 
to run sub-accounts, were fined by the CSRC a collective 
number of CNY 450 million (US $67 million) for 
knowingly assisting in the illegal operation of securities 
business.98 After that, most online money-matching 
 
 
90 CSRC, “CSRC seeks public comments on Regulation of Margin Trading and Short Selling in Securities Firms” (12 June 2015) available at: 
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platforms ceased to offer margin lending service to 
investors, so the once prevalent form of margin 
financing came to a halt.  
The crackdown of shadow lending businesses, to 
some extent, can protect the benefits of Chinese 
investors, as most retail investors are no longer able to 
borrow money from shadow banks to buy shares, and 
only a small proportion of them meeting certain capital 
requirements can open margin finance accounts with 
official securities firms. Apparently, the regulator 
wants to make sure that only qualified and professional 
investors can have access to this kind of investment 
tool. However, the sudden crackdown of money-
matching firms can also be problematic. It is said to 
cause a sudden liquidity drain in the market as a large 
number of illegal accounts were forced to be closed and 
liquidated in a short time.99 Moreover, the crackdown 
mainly targeted well-known online money-matching 
platforms rather than offline money-matching firms, 
the business of which is more secretive and thus more 
difficult to detect and regulate, so there are still some 
money-matching services which can be found. 
 
Conclusion  
After more than two decades of capital market reform, 
China now has the second largest securities market in the 
world. It witnessed a super bull market from 2014–15, 
when the major SSE Composite Index more than doubled 
and the tech-heavy ChiNext Index tripled. However, 
people are wondering about the driving force behind this 
bull run, as the Chinese economy encountered a 
significant slowdown in recent years. Currently, the major 
player in the Chinese stock market has been the 90 million 
retail investors, many of whom rushed to open share 
trading accounts during the bull market. However, most 
investors lacked the necessary investment knowledge and 
risk awareness, relying on “concept stocks”, to buy shares. 
It explains why the rise and fall of share price of public 
companies in China bears little connection to their 
business performance and the general economic condition.  
This article examined two types of margin financing 
that allows Chinese investors to borrow money to buy 
shares, which is considered as the major cause of the bull 
run. First, investors having assets over CNY 500,000 
under their share trading accounts can borrow up to two 
multiples of their own money from securities brokers. 
Secondly, investors can also borrow cash from money-
matching firms with fewer restrictions on their capital as 
well as a higher leverage ratio. Clearly, the increased use 
of borrowed money by retail investors pushed the share 
price of Chinese listed companies to its highest level after 
2008, which is therefore called a “leveraged bull”. 
However, in June 2015 the market started to fall sharply as 
investors started to realise most 
 
 
 
shares did not deserve such a high price and the whole 
bull run was merely a frothier bubble supported by 
excessive liquidity. As the bubble suddenly burst, 
investors rushed to sell off and most of them suffered a 
great loss in several months, which also caused 
turbulence to capital markets around the world. 
This article then analysed a series of governmental 
measures to rescue the falling share price and restore 
public confidence, despite their limited impact. In 2006, 
the CSRC, for the first time, enacted a piece of pilot 
regulation regarding official margin finance and short-
selling activities, and it was revised twice in 2010 and 
2015 respectively until it became a formal ministerial 
legislation. It contains detailed rules on how securities 
firms shall carry out margin finance business as well as 
the eligibility requirements for investors to open 
margin accounts. However, during the stock boom, 
several securities firms illegally relaxed the rules by 
offering margin accounts to unqualified investors with 
inadequate capitals. The situation has changed as, in 
2015, the CSRC carried out on-site inspections to 
correct the incompliance of relevant firms and revised 
the regulation to set out clearer rules regarding 
investors’ suitability. It is clear that investor protection 
shall always lie at the heart of securities regulation.  
As for the supervision over the underground money-
matching business, the CSRC tried to shut down all 
shadow banks which offer margin loans to almost 
everyone wanting to borrow. The CSRC cancelled shadow 
lenders’ access to open sub-accounts which have been 
used by their clients to trade shares. It can, to some extent, 
protect the interests of retail investors as money-matching 
firms often charge high interest rates and offer loans with 
high leverage regardless of the risks. However, banning 
the whole industry can also be problematic for it suddenly 
resulted in a liquidity drain in the Chinese stock market 
which accelerated the downward spiral. Moreover, this 
move is seen as disrespecting the market discipline since 
there are always some investors who prefer to pay a higher 
interest and borrow extra money to make the bet. Last but 
not least, shadow banking by its nature is impossible to 
eliminate, so even though most existing money-matching 
firms are closed down, there always exist other informal 
channels for those people who would like to borrow 
money.  
Clearly, China’s recent stock rally and the following 
crash taught investors and regulators around the world 
several lessons. Most importantly, a “leveraged bull” 
fuelled by debts is risky and short-lived, and does more 
harm than good to the economy. A long-term bull 
market shall be backed by the sustainable development 
of economy as well as the improving performance of 
public companies, which brings the dividends of 
economic development to most investors. 
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